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ABSTRACT 
In today’s world, the United States is the dominant naval power.  World powers 
are trading naval dominance in favor of naval defense, creating fleets of smaller ships to 
protect their littoral waters.  As a result, the United States Navy will be called upon to 
engage enemy naval forces to ensure access against asymmetrical threats close to  
enemy coastlines. 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a networked, focused-mission platform, 
designed to be swift, agile, stealthy, and capable of defeating asymmetric threats in the 
littorals.  Although the LCS has limited capability to handle simultaneous missions, it 
will not be alone.  The experimental guided missile destroyer DD(X) is the U.S. Navy’s 
next-generation; multimission, surface combatant tailored for land attack and littoral 
dominance, with capabilities designed to defeat current and projected threats. 
Through simulation, data analysis and design of experiment, this model simulated 
15,420 littoral battles to determine if the addition of a multimission platform to an LCS 
squadron affected overall Blue force casualties and mission effectiveness.  The study 
examined squadron composition, size, and effects of sensors and weapon systems in both 
a Surface Warfare (SUW) and Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) scenario.  The data analysis 
revealed that a squadron composition of 5 to 11 LCSs with 1 to 2 DDGs in an SUW 
scenario provided the best outcomes, while Destroyers and aircraft had the most impact 
for AAW missions. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and 
logical errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs 
without additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
 viii
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the impact of a mixed squadron, containing a Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) squadron and multimission surface platforms, on Blue force casualties and 
mission effectiveness.  This summary provides an overview of both the LCS and the 
Zumwalt Class Destroyer (DDG-1000), which was chosen as the multimission platform.  
It also describes the research methodology, conclusions, and recommendations.  The goal 
of this study is to analyze and determine the right mix of LCS ships and traditional 
multimission naval warships in a coastal littoral environment without sacrificing  
mission capability. 
Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) is 
the lead ship in a class of next-generation, multimission surface vessels tailored for land 
attack and littoral dominance, with capabilities designed to defeat current and projected 
threats and carry out traditional destroyer missions of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Surface 
Warfare (SUW), and Undersea Warfare (USW).  This advanced multimission destroyer 
will bring revolutionary improvements to precise, time-critical strike and joint fires for 
our Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups of the future.  It expands the battlespace by 
over 400%; has the radar cross section of a fishing boat; and is as quiet as a  
Los Angeles Class submarine.  DDG-1000 will also enable the transformation of our 
operations ashore.  Its on-demand, persistent, time-critical strike capability revolutionizes 
our joint fire support and ground maneuver concepts of operation, so that our strike 
fighter aircraft are freed for more difficult targets at greater ranges.  DDG-1000 will 
provide a credible forward presence, while operating independently or as an integral part 
of naval, joint, or combined expeditionary forces. 
The LCS, starting with the USS Freedom (LCS-1), are a new class of fast, agile, 
and networked warships designed to overcome threats in shallow waters, and are key 
components in a proposed family of next-generation surface vessels that also includes the 
much larger DDG-1000 destroyer and the future experimental guided missile cruiser 
CG(X).  LCSs will be able to deploy independently to littoral regions throughout the 
 xxii
world; remain on station for extended periods of time, either with a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG) or an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), or through a forward-basing 
arrangement; operate independently or with an LCS squadron.  When deploying an LCS 
as part of a squadron, a Combatant Commander may decide to equip multiple LCS 
platforms with a mix of focused-mission packages to ensure operational success across 
the broad range of challenges associated with littoral warfare. 
The objective of the LCS concept of operations is to allow the United States Navy 
to reduce the shipboard manning requirements and maximize asset allocation for the rest 
of the surface force.  The LCS will incorporate advanced technologies, employing  
cost-optimized advanced weapons; sensors; data fusion; command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems; hull forms; propulsion systems; manning concepts; smart control systems; and 
self-defense systems. 
The goal of this study is to analyze and determine the right mix of LCS ships and 
traditional multimission naval warships in a coastal littoral environment without 
sacrificing mission capability.  The guiding questions are: 
 How many LCSs should there be in a squadron, when adding  
multimission warships? 
 What is the impact of reducing an LCS squadron containing traditional 
multimission platforms in an environment that may contain  
multiple threats? 
 How effective are the force self-defense weapon systems, with regard to 
enabling completion of the focused mission? 
This study uses simulation, data analysis, and other techniques to investigate these 
questions and develop a methodology to determine the best configuration of an LCS 
squadron for a given region, based on the threats that may exist.  The approach to these 
questions was to create two scenarios based on LCS and DDG capabilities:  SUW and 
AAW.  In each of these scenarios, a secondary or tertiary threat is included.  That other 
threat is from submarines, allowing some exploration of the Antisubmarine Warfare 
(ASW) capabilities of the LCS ASW mission package.  Each scenario’s mission is the 
 xxiii
same:  render the current mission threat neutralized.  For the SUW scenario, the 
combined squadron of LCS/DDG will face a combined force of a missile boat and 
submarine threat.  For the AAW scenario, the squadron will face a primary threat from 
the air and secondary threat from the surface, with hostile submarines operating in the 
area.  The intent of this scenario is to capture the multimission capabilities inherent in  
the DDG. 
 
Figure ES-1. Screen Shot of the AAW Scenario in MANA. 
The simulation used to model these scenarios is an agent-based combat modeling 
tool called Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA).  MANA is a combat model 
developed and given to NPS by New Zealand’s Defence Technology Agency (DTA); it is 
user friendly with a quick learning curve, enabling the modeler to perform excellent, 
quick turn around experiments.  MANA allows the user to create numerous scenarios and 
models.  Agent-based personalities that apply to sensors, weapons, and other parameters 
are easily manipulated in MANA which also lends itself to data farming. 
This modeling tool allows numerous variables (i.e., number of ships, planes, 
submarines, probabilities of kill and detection for sensors and weapon systems) to be 
 xxiv
analyzed over broad ranges, providing insight into a large number of possible outcomes.  
In order to capture as much of the input space as possible, these factors are varied 
through a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH), creating 257 different situations 
for each scenario.  These runs were replicated 30 times each, resulting in 7,710 separate 
scenarios, with a total of 15,420 simulated battles.  These simulated operations were 
conducted in minimum time and setup, and would have been costly if conducted in  
real life. 
An analysis of the simulation results generated by this study was conducted, the 
results of this research supports the following general recommendations: 
In order to produce low mean Blue casualties and high Red casualties against a 
simulated threat environment in this study, the following composition is recommended 
for SUW missions: 
 Three to four SUW LCSs, 2 to 3 ASW LCSs, and one DDG.  At least one 
ASW LCS should always accompany an LCS squadron as a safeguard 
against unknown submarine threats. 
When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an SUW mission that may 
include an AAW threat, the following composition is recommended: 
 Five to seven SUW LCSs, 1 to 2 ASW LCSs, and 1 to 3 DDGs. 
In the absence of reliable intelligence the following composition is recommended: 
 Five SUW LCSs, one ASW LCS, and two DDGs.  This allows for 
overlapping of capabilities without compromising the force.  This would 
also apply when situations may contain a credible submarine threat. 
With regard to the effects of sensors and weapon systems, the analysis reveals  
the following: 
 The number of missile boats and SUW LCSs are more significant than 
sensors and weapon systems in the SUW scenario. 
 155mm Probability of Kill (Pk), SM-2 Pk, 57mm Pk, Hellfire Pk, Torp Pk, 
ASW Helo Probability of Detection (Pd), ASW O Pd, and Non-Line of 
Sight (NLOS) Pk significantly contribute to the Measures of Effectiveness 
 xxv
(MOEs) in the AAW scenario.  Weapons and sensors that had interactions 
with one another in the analysis were also significant. 
Upon completion of the simulation experiments and data analysis, the results of 
this study support the following recommendation for the two scenarios modeled: 
 In order to produce low mean Blue casualties and high Red casualties, it is 
recommended the employed LCS squadron consist of 5 to 11 LCSs, with  
1 to 2 DDGs.  DDGs provide overlapping capabilities and a creditable  
AAW deterrent. 
 When deploying an LCS squadron for an SUW mission, it is 
recommended that the force consist of 3 to 4 SUW LCSs, 2 to 3 ASW 
LCSs, and one DDG.  At least one ASW LCS should always accompany 
an LCS squadron as a safeguard against unknown submarine threats. 
 When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an SUW mission that 
may include an AAW threat, the following composition is recommended:  
5 to 7 SUW LCSs, 1 to 2 ASW LCSs, and 1 to 3 DDGs. 
 In situations where enemy force disposition is uncertain, the recommended 
compositional “rule of thumb” is five SUW LCSs, one ASW LCS, and 
two DDGs.  This allows for overlapping of capabilities without 
compromising the force.  This would also apply when situations may 
contain a credible submarine threat. 
 The use of simulation and experimentation helped provide valuable 
information that was timely and insightful for platforms not yet certified 
for combat.  It is recommended that these techniques be used in future 
Navy research to guide the development and deployment of  
new technologies. 
 The benefits of using an adaptable, yet easy to learn, simulation tool like 
MANA cannot be overemphasized.  The use of MANA for this research 
allowed for quick turn around results, which under normal conditions and 
with the use of more robust simulation tools, would have taken months 
instead of days or weeks.  Tools such as this give commanders insight that 
is sufficient to make decisions in a timely manner. 
This research provides insightful and analytic support for the size and 
composition of an LCS squadron supported by multimission combatants, such as the 
DDG, and identifies the significant sensors and weapon systems needed for each warfare 
area reviewed.  The end product is information that can be used by decision makers in 
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developing policies, Concepts of Operation (CONOPS), and Tactics,  




Who Commands Sea -- Commands Trade 
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN  
on day of departure from the Navy Department as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
A. OVERVIEW 
 In today’s world, naval threats have changed; blue ocean fleet engagements have 
given way to more littoral operations.  This leaves naval assets at risk in coastal regions, 
and vulnerable to coastal missile launchers on land.  The big concerns are the bombing of 
the USS Cole in Yemen, modern-day pirates on the open seas, and small boat swarms.  
As a result, sea lanes are at greater risk, impacting world trade.  Rogue nations are 
imposing their political and military agendas, creating uneasy and tenuous conditions in 
these regions.  Lastly, the United States is engaged in a protracted global war on terror.  
What capability that is needed is the right mix of assets and technology.  The introduction 
of new platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the destroyer DD(X), and others 
are paving the way.  New Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and Concepts of 
Operations (CONOPS) are needed to ensure these new platforms are effectively and 
safely used.  Other related mission areas affected are Maritime Interception Operations 
(MIO), involving high-seas piracy; escort operations such as Operation Ernest Will, 
where the United States Navy escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers during the late 80s; 
humanitarian aid; and ongoing Stability, Security, Transition, and Recovery (SSTR) 
operations in Iraq. 
 The DD(X) was picked for this analysis because it represents the cutting edge in 
warship design.  Like the LCS, it has not yet deployed and is unproven; however, by 
using simulation, we can gain useful insight into her capabilities.  Unlike many warships 
today, the DD(X) meets the U.S. Navy’s requirement of a ship “doing more with less,” 
using a mix of technologies never used in warship design.  The DD(X) is a multimission 
warship, hosting a variety of weapons. 
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 The areas of concern for today’s surface warrior are the various choke points 
around the globe.  Examples are the Persian Gulf, Straits of Malacca, and Red Sea,  
to name but a few.  These areas have had incidents of high seas piracy and harassment by 
rogue nations. 
 What is the solution?  What class of ship is best suited for littoral operations? Is it 
the LCS, the current Arleigh Burke class destroyer (DDG-51), or the new DD(X)?  What 
is the best way to employ these platforms and their respective combinations?  What are 
the vulnerabilities and what information can be passed on to ship designers from this 
study to assist in assessing future naval warship requirements?  These are the questions 
explored in this study. 
B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The LCS is a new platform designed for providing multimission support in littoral 
operations by leveraging new and proven technologies.  It has the flexibility to operate 
independently or as a member of a Surface Action Group (SAG) or squadron, or as part 
of a Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group (CSG/ESG).  However, the LCS has a large 
dependency on mission packages, which can limit its capabilities in the event it is not 
equipped to handle the new threat.  The primary motivation for this study is to determine 
the impact of a mixed squadron, containing the LCS and traditional surface platforms, on 
Blue forces and mission effectiveness. 
The LCS is a focused mission platform, using specially-designed modules to carry 
out a specific mission.  A single LCS is therefore incapable of handling simultaneous 
missions, whereas it is most capable when operating in a squadron.  If the LCS could 
operate in conjunction with multimission warships, such as the Arleigh Burke Class or 
DD(X) Class destroyers, perhaps the overall size of each LCS squadron could be 
lowered, resulting in the leveraging of capabilities without sacrificing mission 
effectiveness.  An adequate force mix could be, for example, one or two destroyers with 
3-5 LCSs.  In a previous study, Ben Abbott (2008) concluded that the right mix of 
mission capabilities resulted in a squadron size of 6-10 LCSs, which produces relatively 
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low friendly casualties with high enemy casualties in each of the three warfare areas:  
Mine Interdiction Warfare (MIW), Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), and Surface Warfare 
(SUW). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this study is to analyze and determine the right mix of LCS ships and 
traditional multimission naval warships, capable of handling traditional threats in a 
coastal littoral environment without sacrificing mission capability.  While this study 
cannot account for all possible situations or environments, these questions will provide 
guidance to this research: 
 How many LCSs should there be in a squadron when adding multimission 
warships? 
 What is the impact of the reduction of an LCS squadron containing traditional 
legacy platforms in an environment that may contain multiple threats? 
 How effective are the force self-defense weapon systems with regard to 
completing the required mission? 
This study uses simulation, data analysis, and other techniques to investigate these 
questions and develop a methodology to determine the best configuration of an LCS 
squadron for a given region, based on the threats that may exist. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
We know from real-world examples that small boat swarm tactics are a cheap and 
easy way of thwarting and defeating enemies by using numbers and confusion in the 
battlespace.  Overwhelming an enemy is what small boat swarms want to do and this is a 
very real concern to the United States Navy.  Upon completion of this research, the goal 
is to provide the Navy with analytical support for the continued development of policies, 
CONOPS, and tactics for the LCS and its mission packages.  Additionally, this study 
produces insight into the capabilities of an LCS squadron operating with legacy platforms 
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in an environment that presents many operational challenges.  Ultimately, this study will 
further provide the Navy with a better understanding of the best configuration of an LCS 
squadron, in conjunction with more traditional platforms, to successfully support joint 
force operations in an environment rampant with uncertain challenges. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Upon completion of this study, it is hoped that the Navy can evaluate operational 
configurations of an LCS squadron with legacy platforms engaged in littoral operations.  
Quantifiable measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for two primary mission areas, and a 
threshold for each, is assigned to measure the effectiveness of a combined LCS/legacy 
platform SAG. 
Parametric analysis will be used to determine probabilities of target acquisition, 
classification, and neutralization for each mission package.  In order to evaluate 
performance against established success criteria, an agent-based computer simulation is 
used to place the SAG in numerous scenarios that contain multiple threats. 
This study uses an agent-based distillation—a type of computer simulation that 
attempts to model only the salient features of a situation and not every possible 
characteristic (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004).  The tool used is Map Aware  
Non-uniform Automata (MANA), a product developed by New Zealand’s Defence 
Technology Agency (DTA).  The methodology is to develop scenarios that present a 
range of threats for each mission area.  These scenarios are then replicated, many 
thousands of times, in the simulation tool and the performance of the LCS and the chosen 
legacy platform is analyzed.  Exploratory analysis, or data farming, will then identify 
previously undetermined characteristics and situations that develop during the 
simulations (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004).  Statistical analysis and techniques will 
identify and determine the importance of interactions between variables.  The results of 
the statistical analysis will help identify the best configuration of an LCS squadron for 
each scenario, noting that LCSs will not operate independently of legacy platforms.  
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Through quantitative analysis, this study will enhance understanding as to how to 
supplement an LCS squadron in order to best configure it for a given region and  
threat set. 
 6
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II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 In order to accurately capture how an LCS and DDG-1000 will perform its 
mission in a littoral environment, scenarios are created that contain both a primary threat 
and secondary threat.  In this chapter, an overview of both LCS and DDG-1000 is given, 
as well as descriptions of the scenarios used for this study.  After covering the scenarios, 
a brief description of the MANA simulation tool used to model both LCS and DDG-1000 
is given.  This chapter will also provide details on the approach taken for this simulation. 
B. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) DESIGN 
1. Overview 
The LCS, starting with the USS Freedom (LCS-1), is a new class of fast, agile, 
and networked warships designed to overcome threats in shallow waters and are key 
components in a proposed family of next-generation surface combatants that also 
includes the much larger DDG-1000 destroyer (included in this study), and the future 
CG(X) cruiser.  LCSs will be able to deploy independently to littoral regions throughout 
the world; remain on station for extended periods of time, either with a CSG or an ESG 
or through a forward-basing arrangement; and operate independently and/or with an  
LCS squadron. 
The objective of the LCS CONOPS is to allow the Navy to reduce the shipboard 
manning requirements and maximize asset allocation for the rest of the surface force.  
The LCS will incorporate advanced technologies, employing cost-optimized advanced 
weapons; sensors; data fusion; command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; hull forms; propulsion 
systems; manning concepts; smart control systems; and self-defense systems  
(Peoships, 2008). 
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The most transformational feature of the LCS is its modular capability, which 
gives maximum mission flexibility.  The source of this flexibility resides in the Seaframe 
concept.  The Seaframe is augmented by mission packages that are focused in one of 
three mission areas:  SUW, ASW, or MIW.  However, for the purpose of this study, we 
will only be examining the SUW mission area and the ASW area as the secondary threat.  
Each mission package contains mission modules that are comprised of different mission 
systems illustrated in Figure 1.  This section provides a detailed look into the Seaframe, 
as well as the primary mission packages selected from the LCS for this study. 
 
Figure 1. Composition of a mission package (From:  Taylor, 2008). 
2. Seaframe 
As the core of the LCS, the Seaframe provides basic self-defense capability 
through organic sensors and weapons, and speed.  While two Seaframe designs are under 
construction, both are capable of attaining speeds over 40 knots and are similarly 
equipped.  There are differences between the competing Seaframes, but they are not the 
focus of this work.  Instead, the focus is on the capabilities of the LCS and, specifically, 
the SUW and ASW mission packages.  Figures 2 and 3 show the two competing seaframe 




Figure 2. Lockheed Martin Team LCS Design  
(From:  Program Executive Office Ships, 2008). 
 
Figure 3. General Dynamics-Bath Iron Works LCS Design  
(From:  Program Executive Office Ships, 2008). 
 
Table 1.   Sensors and weapons for the LCS seaframe 
(From:  Naval Warfare Development Command, 2007). 
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3. Mission Packages 
The mission packages provide the mission warfighting capability of the LCS.  
Three warfare areas have been identified as immediately necessary:  SUW, ASW, and 
MIW.  The possibility of additional mission packages are being considered by the Navy, 
but the focus of this study is on SUW and ASW mission packages. 
a. Surface Warfare (SUW) 
Designed to detect and engage multiple targets in the littorals, the SUW 
mission package strengthens the Seaframe by adding a helicopter armed with hellfire 
missiles, two 30 millimeter guns, and the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) missile system.  
(Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2004)  While the MH-60S is listed as a possible 
part of the SUW mission package, this study models the MH-60R.  The SUW mission 
package, combined with the speed of LCS, provides the Navy with a credible asset to use 
against surface threats in the littorals.  Table 2 shows the systems and weapons contained 
in the SUW mission package (Abbott, 2008). 
 
Table 2.   Systems and weapons contained in the SUW mission package  
(From:  Naval Warfare Development Command, 2007). 
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b. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) 
The ASW mission package takes advantage of off-board technology in the 
search, localization, and prosecution of enemy submarines.  With the inclusion of 
unmanned vehicles, the ASW-configured LCS is capable of sweeping and maintaining 
barriers or operating areas, while reducing the risk of casualties.  The Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles (USVs) employ a dipping sonar similar to that used by the MH-60R Helicopter, 
which is also included in the ASW mission package.  The tactic used by a dipping sonar, 
known as sprint and drift, is not easily modeled in MANA.  Therefore, an average search 
rate was determined for both the MH-60R and the USVs in order to model the effects of 
the sprint and drift tactic.  The Remote Minehunting Vehicles (RMVs) operate differently 
from the USVs in that the former must operate as a pair.  With one RMV towing an 
active source and the second towing a passive towed array, the pair provides a bistatic 
sonar capability (Naval Warfare Development Command, 2007).  Unlike the SUW LCS, 
which can fire or launch several SUW weapons, the ASW LCS does not have an 
antisubmarine weapon that is capable of being delivered by the LCS.  Instead, the ASW 
LCS relies on the MH-60R deploying Mk 54 torpedoes in order to neutralize the enemy.  
Table 3 shows the weapons and systems contained in the ASW mission package  
(Abbott, 2008). 
 
Table 3.   Systems and weapons contained in the ASW mission package  
(From:  Naval Warfare Development Command, 2007). 
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4. Additional Capabilities 
While only two of the three mission packages have been identified, other 
capabilities currently exist and additional needs may present themselves in the future.  
For the purposes of this study, we are only concerned with the SUW and ASW missions.  
In addition to these mission packages, the LCS has inherent MIO capabilities, and the 
possibility of a special operations-capable mission package is also being considered 
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2007).  The creation of additional mission packages 
is not limited to special operations, but is being considered for a broad range of 
operations.  The flexibility of LCSs allows for additional mission packages as necessary, 
as well as creating variations to existing mission packages, which may save cost.  This 
ability to create new mission packages to address a new threat, instead of creating new 
platforms, is one of the strengths of the LCS program. 
C. DDG-1000 DESIGN 
1. Overview 
Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) is 
the lead ship in a class of next-generation, multimission surface combatants tailored for 
land attack and littoral dominance, with capabilities designed to defeat current and 
projected threats and carry out traditional destroyer missions of Anti Air Warfare 
(AAW), SUW, and Undersea Warfare (USW). 
This advanced, multimission destroyer will bring revolutionary improvements to 
precise, time-critical strike and joint fires for our ESGs and CSGs of the future.  It 
expands the battlespace by over 400%; has the radar cross section of a fishing boat; and is 
as quiet as a Los Angeles Class submarine.  DDG-1000 will also enable the 
transformation of our operations ashore.  Its on-demand, persistent, time-critical strike 
revolutionizes our joint fire support and ground maneuver CONOPS so that our strike 
fighter aircraft are freed for more difficult targets at greater ranges.  DDG-1000 will 
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provide a credible forward presence, while operating independently or as an integral part 
of naval, joint, or combined expeditionary forces. 
DDG-1000 will have a crew of 142, including the aviation detachment.  This 
represented major theoretical cost saving compared to crew levels of 330 on Spruance 
destroyers and 200 on Oliver Hazard Perry frigates.  DDG-1000 will have a sensor and 
weapons suite optimized for littoral warfare and for network-centric warfare. 
2. Capabilities 
The DDG-1000 is equipped with 20 four-cell Peripheral Vertical Launch System 
(PVLS) launchers, designed by Northrop Grumman, that are situated around the 
perimeter of the deck, rather than the usual centrally located Vertical Launch Silo (VLS).  
This will reduce the ship’s vulnerability to a single hit.  Missile systems include Tactical 
Tomahawk intended to succeed Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Standard 
Missile SM-3, and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) for air defense (see  
Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. DDG-1000 Ship Design and Characteristics 
(From:  Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, 2008). 
The ship will also have two 155mm Advanced Gun System (AGS) guns, designed 
by BAE Systems, capable of firing up to 100 nautical miles (NM) at a sustained rate of 
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12 rounds a minute.  It will be equipped with a fully automated weapon handling and 
storage system and a family of advanced munitions and propelling charges, including the 
Global Position System (GPS)-guided Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP).  Up 
to 900 rounds of LRAP ammunition will be carried, including technologies derived from 
the Navy’s Extended-Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the U.S. Army’s 155mm XM-
982 projectiles, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 5in projectiles.  The 
ship’s Close-In Gun System (CIGS) will be the BAE Systems 57mm Mk 110 naval gun, 
found on the LCS, with a firing rate of 220 rounds a minute and range of 14km  
(nine miles). 
The radar suite will consist of dual-band radar for horizon and volume search—a 
Lockheed Martin S-band Volume Search Radar (VSR) integrated with the AN/SPY-3 
multifunction radar already being developed by Raytheon for the United States Navy.  
The two radars are to be integrated at waveform level for enhanced surveillance and 
tracking capability.  The AN/SPY-3 Multifunction Radar (MFR) is an X-band active 
phased-array radar designed to detect low-observable, antiship cruise missiles and 
support fire-control illumination for the ESSM and standard missiles.  At the heart of the 
ship’s integrated USW will be a dual-frequency (high/medium) bow array and a 
multifunction towed array.  The DDG-1000 will also include two landing spots for 
helicopters, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  Figure 5 shows an artist 
impression of a DDG-1000 in combat. 
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Figure 5. Artist Impression of DDG-1000 in combat. 
(From:  Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, 2008). 
D. DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIOS 
The initial design for the SUW scenario developed by LT Ben Abbott (2008) was 
used.  Once all the parameters were verified as correct, the DDG-1000 agent was added 
to the scenario as part of the LCS squadron.  All of its SUW capability was also modeled.  
These scenarios contained the SUW mission as the primary threat and the ASW mission 
as the secondary threat.  This was done to compare results between this effort and prior 
research.  This section explains the different scenarios in detail. 
1. SUW Scenario 
A CSG is preparing to transit a strait in a contested region.  A nation that borders 
the strait disapproves of the CSG’s presence in what it claims as its territorial waters, and 
is determined to take the necessary actions to prevent the transit.  Intelligence reports 
suggest that the possibility of the CSG being attacked by missile boats is high, but the 
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number of possible attackers is unknown.  These reports further stipulate that enemy 
submarines may be underway in the strait, and could support the missile boat attack.  The 
locations of the missile boat threat and possible submarine threat are unknown.  This 
straight is also a high traffic area for neutral merchant ships transiting the region.  The 
CSG has asked for a squadron of LCSs to patrol the straight, providing advanced 
screening and force protection for the CSG.  The force will include the new  
USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000), the Navy’s newest Aegis destroyer, which recently 
completed its first deployment and shakedown cruise. 
a. Enemy 
The enemy’s primary mission is access prevention of the straits to any 
U.S. vessel.  Fast attack guided missile boats deployed in the strait have been ordered to 
engage any U.S. vessels detected.  Due to their individual vulnerability, missile boats 
often travel and attack as a group.  Diesel submarines may or may not be underway in the 
strait, have been ordered to patrol the entrance of the strait, and to engage any U.S. vessel 
trying to gain entrance. 
b. Friendly 
The LCS squadron will vary in size and allocation of mission packages.  If 
an ASW LCS is included in the squadron, it will only use its MH-60R and USV for 
detection and prosecution of submarines due to the speed necessary for timely completion 
of the mission.  The squadron will transit the strait at 20 knots, with its respective 
helicopters deployed, searching for missile boats.  If an ASW LCS is included in the 
squadron, this allows the use of the ASW MH-60R as both a scout and pouncer for 
enemy submarines, and uses the SUW MH-60R as a scout for early detection of missile 
boats (Abbott, 2008).  The DDG-1000 will provide the LCS squadron with the bigger 
surface picture, as it uses its SPY-3 Aegis sensor capability to screen the force of all 
enemy threats operating in the area. 
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c. Mission 
The mission of the combined LCS/DDG squadron is to clear the strait of 
any missile boat threats in order to provide a safe transit for the CSG, while minimizing 
the number of friendly casualties.  Any detected submarines will be considered as 
supporters of the missile boat threat, and viewed as targets of opportunity.  Figure 6 
shows the SUW scenario at problem start (Abbott, 2008). 
 
Figure 6. Screen shot of SUW Scenario from MANA. 
2. AAW Scenario 
A CSG is preparing to transit a strait in a contested region.  A nation that borders 
the strait disapproves of the CSG’s presence in what it claims as its territorial waters, and 
is determined to take the necessary actions to prevent the transit.  Intelligence reports 
suggest that the possibility of the CSG being attacked by multiple threats is high, but the 
number of possible attackers is unknown.  The reports further stipulate that the enemy 
may employ the use of strike aircraft in support of surface and subsurface combatants to 
attack friendly forces.  The locations of the threats are unknown.  This strait is also a high 
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traffic area for neutral merchant ships transiting the region.  The CSG has asked for a 
squadron of LCSs to patrol the strait, providing advanced screening and force protection 
for the CSG.  The force will include the new USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000), the Navy’s 
newest Aegis destroyer, which recently completed its first deployment and  
shakedown cruise. 
a. Enemy 
The enemy’s primary mission is access prevention of the straits to any 
U.S. vessel.  Fast attack guided missile boats that are deployed in the strait, supported by 
air cover, have been ordered to engage any U.S. vessels detected.  Due to their individual 
vulnerability, the enemy has bolstered its resolve providing Surface Combat Air Patrol 
(SUCAP) for the missile boats, which usually travel and attack as a group.  These strike 
aircraft will engage all friendly force air and surface targets.  Diesel Submarines, which 
may or may not be underway in the strait, have been ordered to patrol the entrance of the 
strait and to engage any U.S. vessel trying to gain entrance. 
b. Friendly 
The LCS squadron will vary in its size and allocation of mission packages.  
If an ASW LCS is included in the squadron, it will only use its MH-60R and USV for 
detection and prosecution of Submarines, due to the speed necessary for timely 
completion of the mission.  The squadron will transit the strait at 20 knots, with its 
respective helicopters deployed, searching for missile boats.  If an ASW LCS is included 
in the squadron, this allows the use of the ASW MH-60R as a both a scout and pouncer 
for enemy Submarines, and uses the SUW MH-60R as a scout for early detection of 
missile boat (Abbott, 2008).  The DDG-1000 will provide the LCS squadron with the 
bigger surface picture, as it uses its SPY-3 Aegis sensor capability to screen the force of 
all enemy threats operating in the area.  The DDG-1000 SPY-3 sensor suite will be 
critical to the squadron’s survivability in the event of a combined enemy forces attack.  
The SPY-3 can detect strike aircraft from ranges beyond that of the LCS. 
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c. Mission 
The mission of the combined LCS/DDG squadron is to clear the strait of 
any enemy threats in order to provide a safe transit for the CSG, while minimizing the 
number of friendly casualties.  All aircraft that take an aggressive profile against the 
squadron, and have been classified as hostile, will be fired upon.  Any detected 
Submarines will be considered as supporters of the missile boat threat, and viewed as 
targets of opportunity.  Figure 7 shows the AAW scenario at problem start  
(Abbott, 2008). 
 
Figure 7. Screen shot of AAW Scenario from MANA. 
E. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) SIMULATION 
MODEL 
The agent-based distillation tool called MANA version 4.0 was chosen because it 
allowed the greatest fidelity and flexibility to tailor scenarios to accomplish the task of 
this study.  This section discusses the reasons behind the use MANA 4.0 and not other 
available simulation tools. 
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1. The Decision to Use MANA 
Initially, this study was going to involve the modeling of ships in a scene graph 
environment using tools such as SAVAGE Studio, developed by the Modeling, Virtual 
Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS).  This allows a user or modeler to take a pictorial representation of a ship and place 
it into a scene in which, through the manipulation of JAVA programming, the ship or 
entity interact within the parameters of the scene created.  However, after an introduction 
to MANA by Professor Curtis Blais, it was in the best interest of this project to use this 
simulation tool, as it would be able to model both tactics and the specific characteristics 
of the ships in a customized, agent-based simulation environment.  MANA allows a 
robust environment to be created in a very short time window, which is a strong suit of 
this tool.  Figure 8 is a snapshot of the MANA 4 start-up screen for reference. 
 
Figure 8. Screen shot of MANA start-up screen.  Website contains more reference 
material (From:  MANA 2007). 
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MANA is a combat model developed and given to NPS by New Zealand’s 
Defence Technology Agency (DTA); it is very user friendly, with a quick learning curve, 
enabling the modeler to perform excellent, quick turn around experiments.  MANA 
allows the user to create numerous scenarios and models.  Agent-based personalities that 
apply to sensors, weapons, and other parameters are easily manipulated and, more 
importantly, MANA lends itself to data farming. 
F. CHARACTERISTICS OF MANA 
MANA is in a general class of models called Agent-Based Models (ABMs).  
ABMs have the characteristic of containing entities that are controlled by decision-
making algorithms.  Hence, an agent-based combat model contains entities representing 
military units that make their own decisions, as opposed to the modeler explicitly 
determining their behavior in advance (MANA 2007). 
To differentiate MANA and ISAAC/EINSTein, etc., from highly detailed models 
that can also use agents, MANA and similar tools are sometimes called Agent-Based 
Distillations (ABDs).  This reflects the intention to model the essence of a problem.  
MANA falls into a subset of these models, called cellular automaton (CA) models.  CA 
models have their origin in physics and biology.  The famous Ising model of magnetic 
spin alignment is an example of such a model in physics, while Conway’s “Game of 
Life” is an example of a CA model designed to explore biological ideas.  MANA and 
other CA models are often called complex adaptive systems (CAS) because of the way 
the entities within them react with their surroundings (MANA 2007). 
The MANA model is an attempt to create a complex, adaptive system for some 
important real-world factors of combat such as: 
 Change of plans due to the evolving battle. 
 The influence of situational awareness when deciding an action. 
 The importance of sensors and how to use them to best advantage. 
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The difference between MANA and other agent-based combat models is that 
MANA builds on and complements the earlier ISAAC/EINSTein CA models developed 
by the Center for Naval Analyses, and the now discontinued Archimedes model that was 
being designed for the United States Marine Corps.  Its primary use is as a “distillation” 
tool; that is, to create a bottom-up abstraction of a scenario that captures just the essence 
of a situation, but avoids nonessential detail.  MANA was designed to explore key 
concepts that ISAAC (at that time) was unable to explore:  situational awareness, 
communications, terrain map, waypoints, and event-driven personality changes  
(MANA 2007). 
1. Simulation Goal 
The scenarios developed for this study are designed to gain insight into the size 
and composition of an employed LCS squadron when augmented by multimission 
platforms, such as a DDG.  The primary MOE is not the number of enemy killed, but the 
number of friendly force casualties suffered.  The important factors in this simulation are 
the number of enemy combatants, the number and type of LCSs, the number of DDGs, 
the probability of detection by friendly sensors, and the probability of kill for  
friendly weapons. 
2. Terrain and Scale 
MANA is a time step model that requires a coupling of simulation time and real 
time, as well as the simulation world and the real world.  In this simulation, each time 
step is equal to 30 seconds.  Each scenario lasts no longer than 5,000 time steps, which is 
slightly less than 48 hours.  The simulation map is 1,000 pixels by 1,000 pixels, 
corresponding to a real-world map of 335 NM by 225 NM.  This produces a pixel to 
nautical mile ratio of about 3:1, which provides for accurate modeling of agent 
movements.  This means that each pixel is approximately equivalent to 1/3 of a nautical 
mile.  If large pixels to nautical mile ratios are used, agents could move in unrealistic 
ways.  The above couplings results in a single run lasting anywhere from 7 to 90 minutes  
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on computers with processor speeds ranging from 448 MHz to 3.19 GHz.  The source of 
variation in these run times is the number of agents involved in that given run (Abbott, 
2008). 
MANA was originally designed to model land warfare; however, MANA does 
provide a good foundation for creating other types of scenarios.  Terrain such as hilltops, 
brush, roads, and walls give way to islands and water.  Since these scenarios are all 
nautical, terrain is not used, with the exception of the wall and hilltop feature.  The wall 
feature is used to prevent ships and submarines from running aground, and the hilltop 
feature is used in the SUW scenario to prevent agents from detecting and engaging each 
other over a peninsula.  A terrain map was created by selecting the desired area map and 
then using the MANA Scenario Map Editor to line the land in the map with the wall 
feature, while covering the peninsula with the hilltop feature.  This terrain map is used by 
the agents to assess situational awareness.  The different terrain features are assigned 
different colors in MANA:  gray is the color for the wall feature and dark gray identifies 
the hilltop feature.  Figure 9 shows the terrain and background maps. 
 
Figure 9. Terrain (left) and Background (right) maps used in both scenarios.  The 
gray lining the land on the terrain map is the wall feature and the dark gray covering the 
peninsula is the hilltop feature (From:  Abbott 2008). 
The terrain map is not the map seen by the user while conducting runs; what is 
seen is the background map.  This allows the user to show a recognizable, real-world map 
during simulations without affecting the agent’s simulation awareness.  Essentially, the 
terrain map is for the agents and the background map is for the user (Abbott, 2008). 
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3. Enemy Forces 
Each enemy agent is assigned a starting location in the scenario.  Submarines will 
independently patrol this position until they detect an enemy or take fire.  Submarines 
will pursue a detected friendly agent and will evade if fired upon by increasing speed and 
taking random courses away from friendly forces.  These traits are also used by missile 
boats, with minor variations.  While missile boats do not patrol, they transit and attack as 
a group for safety and cumulative strength.  When a friendly agent is detected, the missile 
boats will pursue, and when taking fire, the missile boats will try to evade while pursuing 
and engaging the friendly agent.  In the AAW scenario, both aircraft and missile boats are 
linked to their respective platform, providing an advantage and allowing coordination of 
attacks.  Submarines are not linked, due to the strong likelihood that they would remain 
hidden from one another and operate independently. 
4. Friendly Forces 
Friendly Blue forces are assigned a starting position as well with waypoints 
specific to each scenario.  Each variant of LCS transits from the home position through 
the waypoints, engaging detected enemies when they are capable.  The helicopters 
associated with the mission packages transit along with the LCS according to their 
speeds, and will pursue and engage any enemies detected.  Fuel consumption is modeled 
for the helicopters, with the SUW MH-60R needing to refuel every 3.5 hours, and the 
ASW MH-60R requiring refueling every 3 hours due to their search tactics.  During their 
refueling, which lasts 45 minutes, none of the helicopters can detect or engage enemies.  
The off-board vehicles behave similar to the helicopters, with the exception of engaging 
enemies and fuel.  None of the unmanned off-board vehicles carry weapons, which limits 
them to pursuing the enemy and passing this detection to their respective LCS  
(Abbott, 2008). 
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5. Sources, Abstractions, and Assumptions 
With every simulation, the source of input data and assumptions are quite 
important.  In this simulation, command, control, communication, computers and 
intelligence (C4I) and logistics are assumed to work perfectly, i.e.,, regarding logistics, 
the location and number of available mission packages is not considered, and fuel (with 
the exception of helicopters) is unlimited.  Failure of equipment and maintenance is also 
not considered in this simulation. 
Enemy force sensor and weapon information, number of weapons per enemy 
agent, and capabilities of certain friendly sensors and weapons were taken from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships 2006, All the World’s Aircraft 2006, the Federation of American Scientists 
Website, and the Global Security Website.  The values given to enemy sensors and 
weapons were generalized and reviewed by Dr. Tom Lucas, Ph.D., combat modeling 
expert at NPS, Captain Jeff Kline, USN (Ret.) and Chair of Warfare Innovation at NPS. 
Both the ASW MH-60R and the ASW USV use a dipping sonar to detect 
submarines—a tactic known as “sprint and drift.”  Since this tactic is not easily modeled 
in MANA, effective search rates were developed as an abstraction.  The search rates are 
based on 5 minutes lowering the sonar, 5 minutes operating the sonar, 5 minutes hoisting 
the sonar, and 5 minutes sprinting to the next search area.  The search rates result in an 
aggregate speed of 20 knots for the ASW MH-60R and 12 knots for the USV.  These 
search rates, as well as the refueling information for the helicopters, were validated 
previously by Jeff Kline, and CDR Doug Burton, USN, Military Instructor at NPS and 
SH-60B pilot (Abbott, 2008). 
This model assumes that each LCS chooses to operate with its armed helicopter 
deployed and that the DDG uses a data-link to pass contact information to the friendly 
forces.  In this scenario, the DDG does not model the MH-60 or UAVs that would 
normally being embarked.  Only the DDG weapon systems and advanced sensors are 
modeled in this study.  This being the case, UAVs contained in the mission packages are 
not modeled.  Characteristics and capabilities of the LCS and its off-board vehicles were 
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provided by CAPT Mike Good, USN, and LCDR Bill Harrell, USN.  The number of 
enemy and friendly agents, as well as the probabilities associated with the friendly 
sensors and weapons are explored through a Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) and will be discussed in Chapter III.  The ranges over which these parameters 
are explored were previously reviewed by Dr. Lucas, Jeff Kline, and  
Colonel Ed Lesnowicz, USMC (Ret.), and updated with new information for this study. 
Very rarely does a simulation tool perfectly fit the problem being modeled.  
Frequently, modeling issues are discovered during the model development process and 
are either fixed through the developers of the tool or addressed through other modeling 
work arounds.  In this study, two such modeling issues were discovered.  The first issue 
is the ability of the ASW LCS to detect submarines at the range of its surface search 
radar.  This occurs because, in MANA, the submarines are modeled as surface contacts 
and the non-ASW-capable assets are programmed to ignore this specific threat.  ASW 
capable assets, however, are programmed to engage any detected submarines.  In order to 
work around this modeling issue, ASW LCSs were not allowed to pass submarine 
contacts to its ASW MH-60R, and were given a stand-off distance of 10 nautical miles 
from detected submarines.  This prevented the ASW LCS from engaging submarines 
from unrealistic distances, and prevented the ASW LCS from driving into the torpedoes 
of an enemy submarine.  While this modeling issue does mean that an ASW LCS can 
detect an enemy submarine, it does not provide an unfair advantage due to the modeling 
work arounds mentioned, and the ASW LCS’s inability to deploy an ASW weapon 
(Abbott, 2008). 
The second modeling issue is dealing with aircraft and surface contacts.  Often the 
weapons designed to shoot enemy surface targets would engage aircraft and vice versa.  
To get around this, the advanced options under the weapons tabs were modified so that 
the weapon would only engage class-specific targets, to get the needed realism in  
the scenario. 
The third modeling issue was the effective use of the DDG’s SPY-3 radar.  Since 
sensors in MANA see all targets on the same plane, it necessary to allow the radar to only 
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see aircraft and not see surface contacts or aircraft.  It was decided to use the A and B 
band settings along with stealth to correctly detect the threats to SPY-3.  Thus, aircraft 
could be seen in the A band, but all the surface contacts would be 100% stealth, basically 
invisible.  For surface contact detection, B band was selected, and in this mode, the 
aircraft would appear invisible when using 100% stealth.  This change allowed the DDG 
SPY-3 sensor to operate in a more realistic manner. 
During the model generation phase, the model was reviewed weekly by 
simulation experts and analysts to ensure the agent behaviors were adequately modeled.  
The model benefited from input from military officers, analysts, and simulation experts 
available at NPS.  This feedback was used to produce accurate scenarios that would 
produce quality results. 
6. Summary 
For this study, a combat modeling tool was used to develop scenarios that 
examined the threat environment that an LCS squadron, supported by DDGs, would 
likely engage.  The scenarios looked at the two specific primary warfare areas, SUW and 
AAW, to stress both ship types in order to provide insight into squadron size, 
composition, and the significance of the technologies employed aboard both platforms.  
The result is a simulation that captures the capabilities of both of these platforms, and the 
inherent risks of operating in littoral areas against an opposing force.  Chapter III will 
discuss the experiment design, assumptions, its many factors and variables, and how they 
come together in the scenario.  These scenarios provide insight into how the LCS and 
DDG platforms can provide mission support across several warfare areas. 
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III. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study is follow-on to research conducted by LT Ben Abbott (2008).  Most 
the information in this section is reused, as it provided the necessary framework and 
foundation to which the study is presented.  Deviations from this study are also presented 
in order to gain further insight into the model.  The model deals with two distinct 
situations, stemming from the mission that an LCS squadron would face in a littoral 
combat environment:  (1) an LCS squadron augmented by a multimission ship, in this 
study the DDG-1000, in a surface engagement involving a missile boat swarm supported 
by diesel submarines; (2) the same squadron composition faced with both the SUW threat 
supported by aircraft.  The aircraft would attempt Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and 
Anti-Air engagements against the Blue friendly forces.  These scenarios provide insight 
into how the multimission platform can provide mission support across several  
warfare areas. 
For this study, a technique called data farming was used.  Simply stated, data 
farming uses a simple simulation model that is run numerous times, while simultaneously 
changing the input parameters (Bain, 2005).  The result is an output that covers a large 
number of possible outcomes.  This technique helps provide a better understanding of the 
system being analyzed and identifies regions that contain interesting events (Cioppa, 
Lucas, & Sanchez, 2004).  This chapter addresses the variables used in this study, 
followed by an explanation of the different designs used throughout the study. 
B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Listed here are the important assumptions made with this model.  There are two 
types of variables used in these simulation—those that are controllable and those that are 
uncontrollable.  Controllable variables are those that can be altered by the user.  
Uncontrollable variables are those that the user cannot control.  Controllable variables are 
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referred to as decision factors, while uncontrollable variables are considered noise 
factors.  This study focuses on the decision factors in order to provide greater insight into 
two new, yet widely different platforms, with the hope of gaining valuable feedback for 
further study.  Enemy sensor and weapon ranges, as well as their associated probabilities 
of detection and kill are fixed, making the number of enemies the only enemy variable.  It 
is important that one variable be held, in this case the red forces, while the Blue forces 
are varied so that changes in the model can be analyzed.  Modeling details for each agent 
and their sensors and weapons is provided in Appendix A.  Table 4 summarizes the 
variables used, their ranges, and a brief explanation. 
Factor Value Range Description 
DDG 1…7 The number of DDG in a given run. 
SUW LCS 1…30 The number of SUW LCS in a given run. 
ASW LCS 0…5 The number of ASW LCS in a given run. 
SUW MH-60R Probability of 
Detection (Pd) 
0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the SUW MH-60R 
sensor. 
ASW MH-60R Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the ASW MH-60R 
sensor 
ASW USV Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the ASW USV 
ASW RMV Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the ASW RMV 
DDG Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the SPY-3 AEGIS 
system 
LCS Pd 0.5…1.0 Probability of detection for the LCS Seaframe 
Standard Missile (RIM-156) 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the Standard missile 
system 
155mm Probability of Kill (Pk) 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the 155mm gun system  
NLOS Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the NLOS missile System 
57mm Pk (Mk110) 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the 57mm gun system 
30mm Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the 30mm gun system 
Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Pk  0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the RAM point defense 
.50 Caliber Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the .50 Caliber guns 
Blue Torpedo Pk (Mk54) 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the torpedo used by the 
ASW MH-60R 
Hellfire Pk 0.5…1.0 Probability of kill for the Hellfire missile system 
used by the SUW MH-60R 
Red Missile boats 5…50 Number of enemy missile boats in each run 
Red Submarines 1…5 Number of enemy submarines used in each run 
Red Aircraft 1…30 Number of enemy aircraft used for in run 
Merchants 0…5 Number of outbound, inbound and anchored 
merchants used for each run 
Table 4.   Variable factors used in the experiment design.  Modeled Factors are in grey, and 
noise factors are in white. 
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1. Controllable Factors 
The following variables were used in order to look at the effectiveness of the 
LCS/DDG squadron.  Since a fixed number of systems (i.e., helicopters and USVs) come 
with each type of LCS mission package, only the number of LCSs is varied.  All of these 
variables were previously modeled by LT Ben Abbott (2008) and hence only new models 
were introduced in order to determine what the impact of a multimission platform, such 
as a DDG, would be if it were a part of an LCS squadron. 
a. SUW LCS 
The number of SUW LCSs in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For the 
SUW scenario, this is varied from 1 to 30 due to the surface threat being primary. 
b. ASW LCS 
The number of ASW LCSs in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For the 
SUW scenario, this is varied from 0 to 5 due to the submarine threat.  ASW LCSs are 
modeled in all scenarios. 
c. DDG-1000 
The number of DDG-1000s in the LCS squadron for a given run.  For all 
of the scenarios, this varied from 1 to 7. 
d. SUW MH-60R Probability of Detection (Pd) 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor for the SUW  
MH-60R.  The sensor being modeled is the AN/APS-147 surface search radar.  This 
variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
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e. ASW MH-60R Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor for the ASW  
MH-60R.  The sensor modeled is the AN/AQS-22 dipping sonar.  This variable is 
modeled only in the SUW scenarios. 
f. DDG Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the 
Zumwalt Class destroyer.  The sensor modeled is the advanced SPY-3 Multi-Function 
Radar (AEGIS) System that is used by the DDG-1000, and assumed to have all of its 
capabilities working.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
g. LCS Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the LCS 
Seaframe.  The sensor modeled is the 3D surface search radar that will be used by LCS.  
This variable is modeled in all scenarios on all types of LCS. 
h. ASW USV Pd 
The probability of detection associated with the sensor used by the USV.  
This study models the use of the Unmanned Dipping Sonar (UDS), which operates 
similarly to the AN/AQS-22 of the ASW MH-60R. 
i. NLOS Probability of Kill (Pk) 
The probability of kill associated with the NLOS missile system used in 
the SUW mission package.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
j. 57mm Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Mk-110 57mm gun system used 
by the LCS Seaframe and DDG-1000.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
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k. 30mm Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the 30mm gun systems used in the 
SUW mission package.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
l. RAM Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Rolling Airframe Missile 
(RAM) system point defense system used by the LCS Seaframe.  This variable is 
modeled in all scenarios, on all types of LCS. 
m. .50 Caliber Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the .50 caliber crew-served 
weapons used by the LCS Seaframe.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios, but only 
on the ASW LCS. 
n. Blue Torpedo Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Mk 54 torpedo employed by the 
ASW MH-60R.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
o. Hellfire Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Hellfire missile system that is 
used by the SUW MH-60R.  This variable is modeled in all scenarios. 
p. 155mm Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the 155mm AGS used by the  
DDG-1000 class.  This is a secondary weapon and is used as such.  The weapon is 
employing only conventional .62 caliber rounds for close-in, ship-to-ship combat. 
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q. Standard Missile Pk 
The probability of kill associated with the Radar Intercept Missile (RIM-
156 standard missile system.  The standard missile is a VLS-capable, extended-range, 
surface-to-air missile.  This variable is modeled only in the AAW scenario. 
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
The following uncontrollable variables were chosen in order to ensure the 
scenarios are realistically uncertain and to explore the capabilities of both the LCS and 
DDG-1000 over a range of conditions.  These variables are factors that a decision maker 
is unable to affect and are seen as noise factors. 
a. Missile boats 
The number of missile boats used in a given run.  The number of missile 
boats is varied from 5 to 50 in the SUW scenario due to their role as the primary threat.  
The missile boats are modeled after the Chinese Fast Attack Craft – Missile (PGGF), and 
are modeled in all scenarios. 
b. Submarines 
The number of submarines used in a given run.  They are varied from  
1 to 5 in the SUW scenario, where they serve as a secondary threat.  The submarines are 
an abstraction of various Soviet-built Kilo class diesel submarines and are in  
all scenarios. 
c. Aircraft 
The number of aircraft used in a given run.  The number of aircraft is 
varied from 1 to 30.  The aircraft are modeled after the Sukhoi SU-24 Fencer produced 
by the former Soviet Union and is widely marketed throughout the world.  This variable 
is modeled only in the AAW scenario. 
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d. Merchants 
The number of each type of merchant (outbound, inbound, and anchored) 
used for a given run.  The adding of merchants provides realism to the scenarios in that 
they add to the surface clutter for both friendly and enemy sensors.  Neither the enemy 
nor the LCS squadron is interested in engaging the merchants, but their presence makes 
detection and classification more difficult.  All three types of merchants (outbound, 
inbound, and anchored) are modeled in both the SUW and AAW scenarios.  As such, the 
number of merchants in each run, times the three types of merchants, will provide the 
total number of merchants for that run.  Merchants are used in the scenarios to provide 
surface clutter, making detection more difficult for both forces. 
C. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
For this study, like that of LT Abbott (2008), three stages were used.  An initial 
exploratory design is implemented to gain familiarity with MANA and to debug any 
modeling issues.  Essentially, this step was used as base knowledge and to understand 
MANA.  Secondly, a preliminary design was created in order to ensure that scenario 
specific agents are being modeled correctly and to identify any last minute concerns.   
LT Abbott’s (2008) design1.xml SUW scenario file was used in order to understand the 
various interactions of the agents in the model.  This was the stepping stone to the final 
experiment, which was used to obtain the data.  This section explains these three designs 
in detail, as well as the experimental design tool used to create them. 
1. Exploratory Design 
To understand MANA’s ability to address the LCS and DDG interaction, an 
exploratory design of the SUW scenario was created.  Since LT Abbott (2008) provided 
the basis for the SUW scenario, a model of the DDG had to be created and explored to 
provide continuity in the scenario.  This exploratory scenario was very abstract, and 
included only a primary threat (a missile boat swarm), and is intended to provide insight 
and understanding of the agents and the model in the SUW scenario.  Several input 
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variables are used:  number of DDGs, number of missile boats, DDG Pd, and weapon 
system model capability.  These variables are varied through the NOLH, creating  
65 different input combinations.  Each of these scenarios were replicated 30 times, 
resulting in 1,950 simulations.  These data points are used to help further develop the 
simulation model. 
2. Preliminary Design 
Since this design is based only on LT Abbott’s (2008) design1 base case SUW 
scenario, additional agents and capabilities are required in order to accurately model the 
other warfare areas and weapon system capability.  The preliminary design was created to 
provide a more detailed look at the specific scenario after the refinement from the 
exploratory design.  The total number of input variables was 19.  This number was 
necessary for the SUW scenario. 
In order to capture as much of the input space as possible, these factors are varied 
through the NOLH creating 257 different situations for each scenario.  These runs were 
replicated 30 times each, resulting 7,710 scenarios and 15,420 simulated battles.  These 
data points were analyzed and the results reviewed by simulation experts on MANA, 
research analysts, and subject matter experts o ensure that the scenarios were being 
modeled correctly before conducting the full experiment.  Some of the insights provided 
from these preliminary results include:  the addition of the AAW scenario, and modeling 
air-to-air combat, air-to-surface engagement, and AAW.  The remaining agents from  
LT Abbott’s (2008) study were retained for this study. 
3. Full Design 
Once the inputs and feedback gained from the preliminary design were provided, 
adjustments were made to the agent behaviors, and the simulation model, so the full 
design could be implemented.  Since no additional input variables were identified, the 
same 257 runs created by the NOLH for the preliminary design were used.  Each of these 
runs were again replicated 30 times each, resulting in 7,710 scenarios and 15,420 
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simulated battles.  These data points were used as the research data and the basis for this 
study, which is covered in Chapter IV. 
4. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
The NOLH experimental design technique was developed at NPS by  
LTC Thomas Cioppa, United States Army, in 2002.  The technique was designed to 
efficiently explore simulations that have a large input space, requiring minimum a priori 
assumptions (Cioppa, 2002).  Just as in LT Abbott’s (2008) study, here we reveal the 
orthogonality of the input variables.  This provides the resulting data statistical properties 
that allow for efficient analysis.  The space-filling property of the NOLH allows the 
analyst to explore more of the input space than the traditional factorial design, in which 
only high and low values are considered.  A NOLH generation tool created by  
Professor Susan Sanchez at NPS is used to generate the designs for this study.  A detailed 
table of the experimental design used for this study can be found in Appendix B.   
Figure 10 shows the orthogonality and space-filling properties of the NOLH through the 
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Figure 10. Scatter plot matrix of the variables in the SUW scenario illustrates the 
orthogonality and space-filling properties of the NOLH.  Labels on the diagonal are the 
names of the variables. 
D. MODEL EXECUTION 
MANA uses eXtensible Markup Language (XML) files to run simulations.  After 
identifying the input variables and creating the scenarios through the NOLH, an XML file 
had to be created for each scenario.  In short, these programs take the inputs from the 
NOLH and use them to generate 257 variations of the base XML file for each scenario.  
The subsequent XML files were then placed on a cluster of computers operated by the 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center for Data Farming at NPS.  
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This cluster of high-performance computers conducted the simulations for both the 
preliminary and full designs (Abbott, 2008).  The preliminary designs took approximately 
one day for the entire run to complete.  The results of the exploratory and final, or full, 
design took approximately 15 hours on the cluster, which created 15,420  
simulated battles. 
This chapter discussed the methods and techniques used to build the scenarios for 
this study.  Chapter IV explains the data analysis methodology, and the tools used to 
investigate the scenario outcomes in MANA in order to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the scenarios presented. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains how the data are collected, our analysis methodology, and 
the designs and statistical tools used to explore the scenario effectiveness in MANA and 
the insights gained.  The purpose is to provide insight into the model, which describes the 
output data, in order to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the scenarios 
presented.  This analysis is a follow-on study to LT Abbott’s conducted in 2008.  It 
provides answers to his future research question:  What is the affect of multimission 
platforms, on an LCS squadron’s composition and size? 
B. PROCESSING THE DATA 
Since MANA uses XML files to run simulations, the output provided is in the 
form of comma-separated values (CSV).  This file allows for simple processing and 
provides the number of injuries and casualties for each agent, as well as the total Blue 
force and total Red force using MANA’s numbering scheme to identify the different 
agents.  In order to compile the output data with the 257 rows of input variables that 
originated from the NOLH, a summary of the scenario output file was needed.  A 
statistical software package called JMP (version 7.0) was used to analyze the data by 
importing the output into JMP. 
Once the input was complete, a calculation of the means of each input 
combination was done.  These 257 rows of mean values were then coupled with the input 
data to create the summary data set used for analysis.  This was done to compare results 
to the same method that LT Abbott (2008) used to analyze his data set in order to gain 
insight to any significant changes.  The MOEs used in this study are the mean total Blue 




the LCS squadron.  While the mean total Blue casualties encompass the entire friendly 
force including unmanned vehicles, the mean total LCS casualties considers only the 
number of LCSs killed. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS 
In Chapter I, three questions were asked as the foundation of this study. Each 
question is addressed through data analysis and discovery.  This analysis includes the use 
of several analytical tools, including regression trees.  Regression trees are exploratory 
models that help reveal structure in data.  An example would be finding a clear change in 
the impact on the numbers of ships in the scenario.  These are also helpful in 
summarizing large data sets with many variables.  In Appendix C, there is a compilation 
of the graphs and regression results used in conducting this analysis. 
1. Impact of the Addition of Multimission Platforms on LCS  
Squadron Size 
This section looks at the impact of the addition of multimission platforms on LCS 
squadron size for each of the scenarios. 
a. SUW Scenario 
In order to determine the impact that a multimission combatant such as the 
Zumwalt Class DDG has on an LCS squadron, the original scenario was recreated with 
the addition of the new DDG agent.  To understand the relationship between the 
variables, the same method of regression (i.e., main effects) was used in LT Abbott’s 
(2008) study.  Figure 11 shows that SUW LCSs and missile boats are the most 
statistically significant in this scenario, and the regression explains 84 percent of the 
variance in mean total Blue casualties.  These same variables are also statistically 
significant and consistent in predicting mean total LCS casualties.  The ASW LCS and 
Submarines are not shown to be statistically significant.  This analysis reveals that SUW 
LCSs and missile boats are the dominant factors in the SUW scenario. 
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In the case of Figure 11, the number of SUW LCS and missile boats are 
the most influential factors on mean total Blue casualties, which is quantified by their  
t-ratios—the larger the t-ratio, the more statistically significant the factor.  The estimate 
column of the regression analysis shows the contribution of each factor to the MOE.  For 
example, for each missile Boat added to the engagement, mean total Blue casualties will 


























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response







































































































































using Main Effects 
explains 84 percent  
of variance in  




factors: SUW LCS 
& Red MB.  
Hughes Salvo 
would explain this. 
 
Figure 11. Regression analysis of Mean Total Blue Casualties for the SUW scenario. 
This regression identifies which factors have more influence and what 
their contribution to the MOE is.  Regression tree analysis (Figure 12), of mean total Blue 
casualties again shows that the missile boats have a significant impact in the SUW 
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scenario.  It also suggests that when there are less than 25 missile boats, having less than 
16 SUW LCSs produces lower mean total Blue casualties.  When missile boats are 
greater than 25, less than five SUW LCSs and two ASW LCSs produces lower mean total 
Blue casualties. 
 
Figure 12. Left side of the regression tree for Mean Total Blue Casualties, where 
there are less than 25 Red missile boats. 
From this initial look, the limit of 11 SUW LCSs is considered as an upper 
bound for the LCS employable squadron.  This is considered the upper bound, as the 
rapid increase in mean Blue casualties accelerates beyond 11 LCSs as depicted in  
Figure 14.  The combination of less than five SUW LCSs and two ASW LCSs are 
suggested to produce lower mean Blue force casualties.  This is consistent with the 
findings LT Abbot (2008) had for his study.  Figures 12 and 13 show portions of the 
regression tree for mean total Blue casualties that illustrate the analysis for the lower and 
















































































Multiple tree splits on the same 
variable shows a nonlinear relationship 
Less than 16 SUW 
LCSs are 
suggested to keep 




Figure 13. Right side of the regression tree for Mean Total Blue Casualties, where 
there are greater than 25 Red missile boats. 
This represents the left side of the regression tree for mean total Blue 
casualties.  Regression tree analysis conducts a binary split, with the lower values 
displayed on the left-hand side.  In each split, the regression tree shows how many cases 
meet the best specified criteria (count), the mean of the MOE for these cases (average 
number of casualties), and the standard deviation associated.  The LogWorth value tells 
us the significance of the split, providing the researcher an understanding of how JMP 
indicates which side has more importance in the next split.  For example, in Figure 12 
(the first split for less than 25 missile boats), there are 111 situations meeting this criteria, 
and for these 111 situations, 4.16 is the mean (average) number of Blue casualties, with a 
standard deviation of 3.33, using only two significant figures. 
Regression tree analysis of the mean total LCS casualties produced similar 
results, supporting the squadron size of 5 to 11 LCSs (Appendix C).  The right side of the 
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equal to 25 missile boats, less than five SUW LCSs and two ASW LCSs yields lower 
mean total Blue casualties.  In the regression tree, there is a scenario where less than nine 
SUW LCSs also yields lower mean total Blue casualties, but it is not as optimal and, 
hence, further splitting of the tree was required to get the lowest mean casualty value, 
with the smallest standard deviation.  The take-away from this regression tree is that less 
Blue targets provides fewer targets for Red forces to engage, keeping Blue casualties low. 
Overall, this is consistent with LT Abbott’s (2008) findings in which he 
stated that a squadron of 6 to 10 LCSs is capable of producing lower mean total Blue 
casualties and mean total LCS casualties.  It was discovered that 5 to 11 LCSs is a better 
working range within this study.  However, submarines and ASW LCSs were not found 
to be significant in this analysis. 
Regression trees are a great way to find the optimal points providing 
greater insight into the study.  In addition to regression trees, it is also very useful to see 
the data plotted on X and Y planes to spot potential trends.  In Figure 14, plotting mean 
total Blue casualties versus the number of LCSs (NumLCS) shows that mean total Blue 
casualties do increase over the range of 5 to 11, but at a reduced rate.  Each data point, or 
dot, in these charts represents the mean of 30 simulated littoral combat operations.  The 
line connects the mean value of the y-axis, either mean total Blue casualties or mean total 
Red casualties, for the corresponding number of total LCSs.  These graphs help to 
identify significant trends or changes in the curve.  When comparing this to the mean 
total Red casualties for the same range, Figure 15 shows that 5 to 11 LCSs produces at 
least 16.1 times as many mean Red casualties than mean LCS casualties. 
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Figure 14. Graphs of Mean Total Blue Casualties and Mean Total Red Casualties vs. 
Number of LCSs shows the impact of an employable LCS squadron with 5 to 11 LCSs. 
 
Figure 15. Graph of Mean Total Blue Casualties, Mean Total Red Casualties, and 
Mean Total LCS Casualties shows the contribution that a DDG has on an LCS squadron. 
 What is not significant, but perhaps implied, in the data is that a multimission 
platform can contribute to the LCS squadron.  This is the first evidence of this.  In  
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of 4.7.  In that study, DDGs, or other multimission platforms, were not considered.  This 
is a significant change, and can only be explained by suggesting that the addition of the 
DDG has raised the Red force casualty rate. 
To gauge whether or not the regression tree was consistent, an additional 
regression tree analysis was performed and, in this instance, mean total Red casualties 
was examined.  That analysis suggested that a missile boat force greater than 27 would 
require an LCS force of greater than five SUW LCSs, as this produces higher mean Red 
casualties.  Again, this is consistent with earlier findings within this study.  A squadron 
size of 5 to 11 LCSs would produce high mean Red casualties, while keeping mean Blue 
and LCS casualties low.  The mix of the various mission packages would have to be 
determined, based on the need of the mission at that time.  However, 3 to 4 SUW LCSs 
and 2 to 3 ASW LCSs, augmented by 1 or 2 DDGs depending on the mission, should be 
sufficient.  Figure 16 shows the contribution that a multimission platform, such as a 
DDG, can have in an LCS squadron.  Again, the effect of this addition to the force is 
greater than was found in LT Abbott’s study. 
 
Figure 16. Graph of Mean Total Blue Casualties, Mean Total Red Casualties, and 
Mean Total LCS Casualties vs. number of DDGs shows the significant contribution made 
by the DDG in this scenario. 
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b. AAW Scenario 
The next analysis is the AAW Scenario.  However, this will not be AAW 
exclusively, merely the addition of AAW threat to the SUW scenario.  The difference 
between the AAW scenario and the SUW scenario is the use of Red force aircraft 
providing support to friendly surface forces.  This scenario will keep the Red submarine 
threat as a tertiary threat giving this a more robust situation.  The addition of aircraft will 
allow the opportunity to take full advantage of the DDG and the air defense capability of 
the LCS via the RAM.  As before, a main effects linear regression was performed in 
order to provide an understanding of the relationship between the MOEs and the 
variables.  What was revealed in the analysis was that SUW LCS, DDG, and Red aircraft 
are statistically significant in predicting mean total Blue casualties, explaining 84 percent 
of the variation.  In addition, the analysis also shows that while Red missile boats are 
important, they are just not as significant as in the SUW scenario.  Figure 17 shows the 
regression analysis of mean total Blue casualties for the AAW scenario. 
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Figure 17. Regression analysis of Mean Total Blue Casualties for the AAW scenario. 
It is important to point out that for this scenario, it was necessary to 
examine LCS, DDG, and Red aircraft casualties to gain insight to the contributing loss.  
Three more regression models were analyzed to examine what impacted each of these 
three platforms.  In the case of mean total LCS casualties, the analysis demonstrated that 
SUW LCS, DDG, and Red aircraft are statistically significant in predicting mean total 
LCS casualties, explaining 82 percent of the variation. For the mean total DDG 
casualties, the analysis revealed that DDG, Red aircraft, and, this time, Red missile boats, 
are statistically significant in predicting the mean total DDG casualties, explaining 81 
percent of the variation.  Lastly is the resulting impact of introducing aircraft to the 
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important to see how aircraft contributed and what was significant.  The analysis revealed 
that SUW LCS, DDG, and Red aircraft are again statistically significant in predicting 
mean total aircraft casualties, explaining 85 percent of the variation, higher than in the 
first analysis for Blue force casualties. 
Upon determining what factors were significant in the AAW scenario, 
regression tree analysis was conducted.  Regression tree analysis of mean total Blue 
casualties shows that aircraft are the most significant factor, which is what should be 
expected from this scenario.  When there are 6 to 11 aircraft, the regression tree suggests 
that less than 17 SUW LCSs produce lower mean Blue casualties.  The regression tree 
also shows that 4 to 6 DDGs produce lower mean Blue casualties when the number of 
aircraft is greater than 11, but less than 16.  Figure 18 shows the regression tree analysis. 
The full regression tree can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 18. Portion of regression tree for Mean Total Blue Casualties for the  
AAW scenario. 
Further regression analysis in Figure 19 shows that between 7 and 13 
SUW LCSs are needed when confronting a force of Red aircraft greater than 16, thus 
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which supports the increase in Blue casualties at 13 SUW LCSs and signifies that this is 
could be an upper limit or force threshold for the squadron. 
 
Figure 19. Portion of regression tree for Mean Total Blue Casualties for the  
AAW scenario. 
In Figure 20, mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties 
increase slowly until reaching 13 Red aircraft, after which Blue force losses accelerate.  
Plotting the number of DDGs versus mean total Red aircraft casualties increases Red 
aircraft casualties, while simultaneously decreasing mean Blue casualties.  DDGs have an 
overall positive effect against mean total Red casualties.  While mean LCS casualties are 
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Figure 20. Graphs of Mean Total Blue Casualties and Mean Total LCS Casualties vs. 
Red Aircraft. 
 
Figure 21. Graphs of Mean Total Blue Casualties, Mean Total Red Casualties, and 
Mean Total Red Aircraft Casualties vs. DDG. 
Sharp increase in Mean Blue 
casualties due to Red aircraft 
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In considering the squadron’s composition for the AAW scenario, 
previous regression tree analysis suggested 7 to 13 SUW LCSs in order to provide lower 
mean Blue casualties.  Adding just one more SUW LCS increases the mean total LCS 
casualties, but reduces mean Red casualties.  The graph can be found in Appendix C.  In 
all AAW scenario analyses, having one or more ASW LCS contributed to the increase in 
mean Red casualties.  This suggests that while at least five SUW LCSs and two DDGs 
are needed in a squadron composition to produce lower mean Blue casualties in the AAW 
scenario, seven SUW LCSs, two ASW LCSs, and two DDGs provide the highest mean 
Red casualties, while staying below the 13-ship threshold where there is a sharp increase 
in mean Blue casualties. 
c. Summary 
In summary, both scenarios provide analytic support for an employed LCS 
squadron.  The range for both scenarios falls between 5 and 13 LCSs.  A composition of 
at least 3 to 4 SUW LCSs and 2 to 3 ASW LCSs is recommended for the SUW scenario.  
The addition of a DDG did not provide a significant difference in the SUW scenario.  For 
the AAW scenario, both aircraft and DDG were significant.  Thus, a squadron 
composition of at least five SUW LCSs, 1 to 2 ASW LCSs and one or more DDGs 
produced lower mean Blue casualties and higher mean Red casualties for the AAW 
scenario.  In essence, when faced with aircraft, the DDG is needed to enhance AAW 
capability in an LCS squadron. 
2. The Effectiveness of Blue Force Self-Defense Weapon Systems 
The next question that needs to be analyzed is the success of sensors and  
self-defense weapon systems on overall Blue force effectiveness.  Sensors and weapon 
systems are important systems and cannot be ignored, and their significance to the overall 
force effectiveness.  This section examines the significance of sensors and weapon 
systems in both scenarios. 
 55
a. SUW Scenario 
The analysis of sensors and weapon systems follows the same methods 
used to examine the composition of the LCS squadron.  We first must understand the 
relationship between the variables and the MOEs.  For sensors and weapon systems, the 
parameters used in the regression analysis are only the variables that are probabilities.  In 
the SUW scenario, when answering the first question in the analysis, no weapons or 
sensors stood out as being individually significant in predicting both mean total Blue 
casualties and mean total LCS casualties when in the presence of SUW LCSs, ASW 
LCSs, DDGs, missile boats, and submarines.  In the regression tree analysis performed 
for squadron size and composition, sensors and weapons showed no significance either.  
Therefore, in the absence of individual significance, we must examine the interaction or 
dependency that the weapons and sensors have with one other parameter in the MOE.  
The type of screening analysis conducted for each MOE was stepwise regression effects 
screening to determine when sensors and weapon systems do become statistically 




Figure 22. Regression analysis of Mean Total Blue Casualties and Mean Total LCS 
Casualties when considering only sensors and weapon systems for the SUW scenario. 
Figure 22 shows us that a more in-depth analysis is needed to determine 
sensor and weapon system dependencies.  Thus, a factored regression analysis was 
created.  This interaction was factored to the second degree, allowing only two 
parameters to show their interdependence to one another.  The results only explained  
four percent of the variance; therefore, a filtering of the dataset was needed.  The 
narrowed parameters for the analysis created a subset, to focus only on the lower and 
upper bound of 5 to 11 LCSs and DDGs.  The DDG was considered because although the 
analysis shows the DDG was insignificant, its sensors or weapon systems could be and, 
hence, the DDG was left in the analysis.  This analysis suggests that sensors and weapon 
systems become statistically significant only in the interaction terms. 
When analyzing mean total Blue casualties, the screening identifies  
.50Cal Pk, LCS Pd, Torp Pk, RAM Pk, ASW O Pd, and other interaction terms as 

























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response


































































































































Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response













































































































effects screening analysis of mean total Red casualties identifies .50Cal Pk, ASW O Pd, 
and other interaction terms as statistically significant, and that they explain 89 percent of 
the variation in mean Red casualties.  These results show that in a squadron size of 5 to 
11 LCSs, 50Cal Pk, LCS Pd, Torp Pk, and ASW O Pd significantly contribute to the 
MOEs.  Figure 23 shows the regression analysis resulting from the effects screening for 
mean total Blue casualties over the data subset in the SUW scenario, when considering 
only sensors and weapon systems. 
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Figure 23. Regression analysis resulting from effects screening of Mean Total Blue 
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b. AAW Scenario 
The AAW scenario will be analyzed in much the same way as the SUW 
scenario.  A regression analysis was performed to gain insight into sensors and weapon 
systems significance in predicting mean total Blue casualties and mean total Red 
casualties.  The results are shown in Figure 24.  Again, as with the SUW scenario, the 
regression analysis reveals that there is no individual significance of the weapon systems 
or sensors. 
 
Figure 24. Regression analysis of Mean Total Blue Casualties and Mean Total Red 
Casualties, when considering only sensors and weapon systems for the AAW scenario. 
Thus, a filter of the complete data set was performed with 5 to 13 LCSs 
and five total DDGs.  This comes from the results of the regression tree analysis.  In 
Figure 25, the effect screening of the filtered data subset shows statistical significance 
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mean total Blue casualties, effects screening identifies 155mm Pk, SM-2 Pk, 57mm Pk, 
ASW O Pd, and Hellfire Pk as statistically significant, and that they explain 44 percent of 
the variation in that MOE. 
 
Figure 25. Regression analysis resulting from effects screening of Mean Total Blue 
Casualties and Mean Total Red Casualties, when considering only sensors and weapon 
systems for the AAW scenario. 
Effects screening of the data subset shows significance among individual 
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.50Cal Pk, NLOS Pk, SM-2 Pk, RAM Pk, ASW O Pd, Hellfire Pk, Torp Pk, ASW H Pd, 
and other interaction terms as significant, and that they explain 69 percent of the variation 
in that MOE for mean Red casualties. 
These results show that in a squadron of LCSs and DDGs, 155mm Pk, SM-2 Pk, 
57mm Pk, and NLOS Pk significantly contribute to the MOEs.  Figure 26 shows the 
regression analysis resulting from the effects screening for mean total Red casualties over 
the data subset in the AAW scenario, when considering only at sensors and  
weapon systems. 
 
Figure 26. Regression analysis resulting from effects screening of Mean Total Red 
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This section has shown that in each scenario, sensors and weapon systems 
contribute at various levels to the MOEs.  In the presence of others, none of the sensors 
or weapons are individually identified as statistically significant, suggesting that previous 
numbers play a larger role in impacting the MOEs.  While .50Cal Pk is significant in the 
SUW scenario, SM-2 Pk is significant in the AAW scenario after the data has been 
filtered to the specified size of the force.  The DDG makes a large contribution to the 
AAW scenario, whereas it plays a minor role in the SUW scenario.  While it is important 
for the sensors and weapon systems to be identified as statistically significant, the results 
show that sensors and weapon systems do contribute to the MOEs during the interaction  
with others. 
D. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
Further insights come as a result of conducting the data analysis.  These serve as 
the lessons learned from this study and what the data tells us.  Often these new insights 
can further be reviewed in follow-on research.  This section outlines those insights and 
the resulting impacts. 
1. LCS Squadron Force Reduction in the SUW Scenario 
When conducting the analysis for size and composition of the LCS squadron in 
the SUW scenario, it was discovered that missile boats and not submarines contributed 
the most to mean total Blue casualties and mean total LCS casualties.  These results 
suggest that the missile boat threat has higher priority in the battlespace in order to reduce 
Blue force casualties.  However, since the ever-increasing spread of diesel submarine 
technology, it would be wise for the LCS squadron to be configured to handle that threat.  
The research here indicates that 2 to 3 ASW LCSs would be sufficient to handle the task.  
The addition of the DDG to the force drives down the requirement for more LCSs and, 
hence, reduced squadron size. 
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2. The Advantages of Multimission Platforms in an LCS Squadron 
The analysis from the AAW scenario clearly points out the importance of having 
sufficient capability in this mission area.  Multimission combatants like the DDG-1000 
bring multilayer defense that the LCS cannot deliver.  The analysis clearly demonstrated, 
as it was predicted, that aircraft are the most important threat in an AAW environment.  
Although in the SUW scenario, force size was slightly reduced, in an AAW scenario, 
numbers are an advantage and especially platforms that can reach out and engage aircraft 
at longer rangers.  The LCS lacks that punch and is therefore vulnerable.  The regression 
tree analysis clearly shows the need for higher numbers in both SUW LCSs and DDGs.  
However, further analysis suggests that too large a force accelerates Blue  
force casualties. 
3. Limitations of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
With the development of the LCS, its ability to engage multiple threats is limited.  
The LCS relies on numbers and mission modules to augment abilities already inherent in 
larger warships.  The ability of the LCS to handle small boat swarms in these scenarios is 
good and provides valuable support to the ship’s design.  However, stand-off,  
air-launched weapons or those from the sea are its Achilles heel, which leaves the LCS 
vulnerable.  In the absence of an AAW-capable platform, the addition of DDGs to the 
squadron provides that credible AAW defense.  In short, the analysis shows that the 
presence of DDGs in an LCS squadron drives down Blue force casualties, while raising 
Red force casualties. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With every new ship building program comes both questions  
and assumptions. 
LT Ben Abbott, USN 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The littoral battlespace requires focused capabilities in greater numbers to assure 
access against asymmetrical threats.  This is the purpose of the LCS.  The multimission 
DDG-1000 Zumwalt is designed for sustained operations in the littorals and land attack, 
and will provide a forward presence and deterrence.  Together, these ships present an 
affordable balance between force size and capabilities to meet current and projected 
threats, helping the United States Navy defeat growing littoral, or close-to-shore, threats 
and providing access and dominance in coastal water battlespace. 
This study set out to provide critical insight into the employment of an LCS 
squadron augmented by a multimission warship, in a stressful operational environment.  
Through the use of realistic scenario simulations, this study produced detailed analysis 
regarding the size, composition, and effects of sensors and weapon systems of this 
squadron.  It also provided a framework for future use of agent-based models, such as 
MANA, in exploring similar or related topics. 
B. QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS STUDY 
A summary discussion of the study questions are addressed in the following. 
1. How many LCSs should there be in a squadron when adding 
 multimission warships? 
Through the process of careful data analysis using several regressions, regression 
with main effects screening and regression trees provided a view of LCS squadron size 
and composition.  The driving force behind this study was to see if multimission 
combatants, such as the DDG-1000, would drive down the numbers needed for LCSs in a 
squadron.  The result was that it did, indeed, lower the requirement.  LT Abbott’s (2008) 
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study said that in the three primary mission areas tested (SUW, ASW, and MIW) 6 to 10 
LCSs produce lower mean casualties for both the Blue force, and LCS specifically, while 
producing higher mean Red casualties in each of the warfare areas.  When one or more 
DDGs were added to the squadron, SUW LCS numbers were reduced between 1 and 2 
for SUW warfare missions.  Overall, the SUW scenario required 5 to 11 LCSs in order to 
keep Blue force casualties low.  For the AAW scenario, an area not previously explored 
by other studies, the force size was slightly larger, emphasizing an LCS footprint of  
7 to 13 LCSs.  Specifically, the study emphasized that 5 to 7 SUW LCSs, and the 
addition of several DDGs, were necessary to counter the AAW threat.  ASW LCSs were 
reduced down to 1 or 2, simply because of the overlapping capabilities that the  
ASW LCS brings to the squadron.  Overall, a DDG brings multimission capabilities that 
are not inherent in the LCS, especially in terms of the AAW threat. 
 2. What is the impact of the reduction of an LCS squadron containing  
  traditional multimission platforms in an environment that may  
  contain multiple threats? 
In this study, when presented with an AAW/SUW combined threat, DDGs were 
significant and provided that stand-off, air defense capability.  The LCS can defend itself 
against air threats, but not against those aircraft with stand-off weapons that can operate 
beyond the range of its RAM system.  The AAW threat modeled the Soviet-built SU-24 
Fencer, carrying weapons capable of hitting the LCS outside of its weapons ranges.  In 
addition, this study clearly shows the significance of the SM-2 missile and its ability to 
hit air threats at greater distances than what the LCS can provide.  Further analysis 
recommends the following LCS squadron composition:  for SUW scenarios, 3 to 4  
SUW LCSs, 2 to 3 ASW LCSs, and 1 or 2 DDGs; the AAW scenario requires 5 to 7 
SUW LCSs, 1 to 2 ASW LCSs, and 1 to 3 DDGs.  This variance in squadron size allows 
the decision maker to decide what is important in the mission.  It is important to note that 
in this analysis, ASW was always a threat, even when it was a tertiary concern to the 
squadron.  In all cases, a squadron size beyond 13 ships is not recommended, as the study 
reveals a significant increase in mean Blue force casualties with decreasing mean Red 
force casualties. 
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 3. How effective are the force self-defense weapon systems with regard  
  to enabling completion of the given mission? 
Each ship design has its specific purpose and with it, the technology applied to 
allow it to complete those assigned missions.  For the LCS, it is littoral warfare—the 
capability of bringing a flexible, yet measurable, response against similar threats in close 
to enemy territory, where a more traditional asset might be constrained.  The DDG-1000 
is designed for multimission threats, including in areas of littoral warfare, where a 
graduated response can be applied and at greater distances than current assets can 
provide.  Each warship has different weapons and sensors:  the LCS is designed for  
close-range engagements with some Over-the-Horizon (OTH) capability; and the  
DDG-1000 is designed for multiple range threat detection and engagement, to include 
asymmetrical threats presented by small, yet capable, missile boats. 
Through this analysis, using multiple regressions, effects screening, and 
regression trees, this study shows that sensors and weapon systems play a more 
significant role in the AAW scenario than the SUW scenario.  For the SUW scenario, 
numbers were the primary mover of the data.  In the AAW scenario, standout systems 
such as the SM-2 Pk, 155mm Pk, 57mm Pk, ASW O Pd, Hellfire Pk, and other 
interactions between sensors and weapons were significant in predicting mean total Blue 
casualties, explaining 44% of the variation in the MOE.  The number was even higher for 
mean total Red casualties, explaining 69% of the variation in the MOE.  However, it is 
worth noting that the weapons themselves generally were insignificant in terms of the 
overall scenario. The weapons were significant when the data was filtered down to the 
subset of the expected squadron size.  While it is clear that the variation is not high and 
the numbers are imprecise for thresholds for most of these systems, this study does show 
that sensors and weapon systems play a significant role in predicting the MOEs. 
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS FROM THE DATA 
In addition to addressing the research questions, this study produced further 
insights into the use of an employed LCS squadron.  This section briefly summarizes 
these insights. 
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1. Significance of Early Detection and Force Communication 
In MANA, forces are able to communicate with one another and pass detection 
and classification information to the overall force.  This presents an advantage, especially 
when presented with a numerically superior enemy force.  This was explored in MANA 
and through repeated observations of the scenario interaction, evidence of targeting 
information being passed by both Red and Blue forces became known.  The contributing 
evidence does not stand out in the analysis, but is noticeable in the associated higher 
casualty rate by both forces.  History tells us that when a force has information about the 
enemy first, they have an advantage.  In the AAW scenario specifically, Red aircraft had 
the ability to combine efforts to detect, classify, and engage threats, this was evident in 
the behavior of the agents.  For Blue forces, SUW and ASW helicopters were able to 
engage enemy missile boats sooner when they were detected and classified by friendly 
sensors, especially by those of the DDG-1000’s SPY-3, with its longer ranges. 
2. Limitations on the AAW Mission for LCS 
The regression tree analysis of the AAW scenario displays an inconsistency in the 
handling of enemy aircraft.  Suggesting that the numbers of LCSs for high levels of 
aircraft and low numbers of LCSs when the threat is large gave rise to the thought that 
there may be a limit to the number of aircraft that a squadron of LCSs can handle without 
support.  In this case, 13 LCSs was an upper bound when confronting aircraft greater than 
16, which was defined in this analysis.  This suggests that this LCS force needs 
multimission platform support and further justifies the need of including at least one 
DDG in the mix, in order to reduce mean total Blue force casualties. 
3. The Benefit of Simulating Operations Using MANA 
The benefit of computer simulation cannot be overemphasized in its ability to 
simulate numerous operations and, in this case, the littoral operations, without placing 
our forces at risk.  A great deal of simulations were executed in a short amount of time, 
with little setup, creating a large number of possible outcomes for review.  The analysis 
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of the results provides the lessons learned and helps improve CONOPS and TTPs for 
these combat environments.  This also provides costs savings in time, money, and 
manpower conducted in real life.  Through this type of experimentation, valuable insight 
can give the decision maker a close approximate answer in much less time than those of 
more complex simulations.  MANA may have been designed for use by land forces, but 
its design and foundation can be adapted for a much broader range of applications. 
4. The Importance of Filtered Data for Analysis 
During the course of this study, analysis was performed to determine cause and 
effect for a given situation.  The sheer numbers of a force were easily handled; however, 
when determining the impact of weapons and sensors in this model, it was not so simple.  
After careful observation, filtering of the data down to what the numbers support in the 
regression trees provided genuine insight into that force’s capability.  Initially, the lack of 
significance created a pause, wondering if the scenario was modeled correctly.  Once the 
data was filtered into a subset, only then was the significance realized for the given 
scenario.  Remember that the majority of the weapons and sensors did not stand out 
themselves; the majority stood out when they interacted with others.  This provided more 
realism to the scenario.  Rarely does any one system operate independent of the others; it 
is usually in concert with all of them.  Thus, filtering the data was used and it aided 
greatly in understanding the applicable forces’ ability to deal with the threat presented. 
The results of this study support the following recommendations: 
 In order to produce low mean Blue casualties and high Red casualties, it is 
recommended that the employed LCS squadron consist of 5 to 11 LCSs, 
with 1 to 2 DDGs.  DDGs provide overlapping capabilities and a credible 
AAW deterrent. 
 When deploying an LCS squadron for an SUW mission in the absence of 
all other threats, it is recommended that a composition of 3 to 4  
SUW LCSs, 2 to 3 ASW LCSs, and one DDG be used.  At least one  
ASW LCS should always accompany an LCS squadron as a safeguard 
against unknown submarine threats. 
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 When deploying an employed LCS squadron for an SUW mission that 
may include an AAW threat, it is recommended that a composition of 5 to 
7 SUW LCSs, 1 to 2 ASW LCSs, and 1 to 3 DDGs be used. 
 In situations where information regarding the disposition of enemy forces 
is uncertain, it is recommended that the compositional rule of thumb be 
five SUW LCSs, one ASW LCS, and two DDGs.  This allows for 
overlapping of capabilities without compromising the force.  This would 
also apply when situations may contain a credible submarine threat. 
 The use of simulation and experimentation helped provide valuable 
information that was timely and insightful for platforms not yet certified 
for combat.  It is recommended that these techniques be used in future 
naval research to guide the development and deployment of  
new technologies. 
 The benefits of using an adaptable, yet easy-to-learn, simulation tool like 
MANA cannot be overemphasized.  The use of MANA for this study 
allowed for quick turn around results, which, under normal conditions and 
the use of more robust simulation tools, would have taken months instead 
of days or weeks.  Tools such as this give commanders a good 
approximation of performance, sufficient to make decisions in a timely 
manner. 
D. TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
While conducting this study, the following topics were identified for  
further research: 
 Analysis of a multiple threat environment on Blue force casualties and 
mission effectiveness. 
 Effects of communication and data links across Blue forces, and its effects 
on both Blue force and Red force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
 Analysis of the impact of a mixed squadron, containing LCS and 
multimission platforms used against shore targets in support of surface 
platforms, on Blue force casualties and mission effectiveness. 
 The modeling and simulation of shore missile threats against Blue forces 
operating in a littoral or near littoral combat environment. 
 Focused analysis of the sensors and weapon systems under development in 
order to provide recommended thresholds. 
 The modeling and simulation effects of indirect fire of surface-to-surface 
missiles against naval targets. 
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 The modeling and simulation effects of stealth technology used in air and 
naval combat. 
 Analysis of total force attrition and survival rates against highly 
maneuverable surface threats. 
 The development and inclusion of coastal and ocean geography for 
MANA to provide realism to naval scenarios. 
 Analysis and effects of sea clutter on naval force targeting against small, 
highly maneuverable surface threats. 
 The development of cruise missile agents in MANA that allow for the use 
of point defense systems. 
 The development of cruise missile agents to be deployed aboard other 
agents.  This would allow for the creation of cruise missile launchers for 
either land or sea platforms. 
 Further development of MANA sensors to allow for the agent to 
distinguish between air and surface threats. 
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APPENDIX A. PERSONALITIES AND CAPABILITIES OF  
MANA AGENTS 
The information in this appendix is provided as a reference for the reader and 
describes the personality of each Blue force and Red force agent used in the  
























APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
This appendix illustrates the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLHs) used 
to conduct the simulation experiment, and their associated correlation matrices.  Since no 
changes were made to the preliminary designs prior to running the full experiment, only 
the full designs are shown.  Due to the size of the design, only a limited amount of the 
rows are provided.  Correlation values are also provided. 
A. EXPLORATORY DESIGN 
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B. SUW FULL DESIGN 
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APPENDIX C. GRAPHS AND CHARTS 
This appendix provides the graphs and charts produced for this study and are 
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